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Abstract 
The current article questions how experimentation in policy-design plays out in practice. In particular, 
it is interested in understanding how the content and process of policy-design experiments affect 
their outcomes. The article does so by building on an original study into 31 real-world examples of 
experimentation in policy-design in the building sector in Australia, the Netherlands and the United 
States. All examples aim to improve the environmental sustainability of the building sector. The 
article finds that these 31 examples have attracted moderate to substantial numbers of participants 
(policy outcome HO.i), but have not achieved substantial numbers of buildings built or retrofitted 
with high levels of sustainability (policy outcome HO.ii). By carefully unpacking these policy-designs 
into a number of key characteristics it finds that this mismatch between the two outcomes may 
partly be explained by flawed policy-design processes. The article concludes with the main lessons 
learnt, and provides some suggestions on how to improve experimentation in policy-design. 
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1 Introduction  
 
policies and proposal for social action [should] be treated as working hypotheses, not as 
programs to be rigidly adhered to and executed. They will be experimental in the sense that 
they will be entertained subject to constant and well-equipped observation of the 
consequences they entail when acted upon, and subject to ready and flexible revision in the 
light of observed consequences – John Dewey (1991 [1927]: 202-203) 
 
an experimental approach to social reform, an approach in which we try out new programs 
designed to cure specific social problems, in which we learn whether or not these programs are 
effective, and in which we retain, imitate, modify, or discard them on the basis of apparent 
effectiveness on the multiple imperfect criteria available – Donald Campbell (1969: 409) 
 
As the above quotes by Dewey and Campbell highlight, experimentation has long been advocated as 
an optimal approach to policy-design. Both authors would likely have been happy knowing that their 
visions appear to have become reality. There is now a large literature that provides a wide range of 
examples of this experimentation in policy-design (for overviews of the literature and a range of 
examples, see Greenberg & Schroder, 2003; Hoffmann, 2011; Van der Heijden, 2012). Yet, the 
current literature on experimentation in policy-design differs slightly from the visions of the past. 
Dewey and Campbell had in mind experimenting with the content of policy programmes (that is, 
testing, piloting, or demonstrating a particular policy-design, to use some terms from contemporary 
empirical policy-design literature; e.g., Markusson, Atsushi, & Stephens, 2011; Vreugdenhil, Taljaard, 
& Slinger, 2012). They do not appear interested in the process of policy-design – i.e., that an 
experimental policy-design has come about is a given to them.  
Currently, however, scholars have become more and more interested in experimentation 
with both the content and process of policy-design. Like Dewey and Campbell they are interested in 
experimental policy-designs that differ from, for instance, traditional direct governmental regulation 
or subsidies (Jordan, Wurzel, & Zito, 2010). Yet, they are also interested in how different actor 
constellations are involved in the process of developing such policy-designs (Hoffmann, 2011). A 
typical example of this contemporary literature builds around what is termed ‘experimentalist 
governance’ (e.g., De Burca, 2010; Overdevest & Zeitlin, 2012; Sabel & Zeitlin, 2011), which is 
defined as ‘a recursive process of provisional goal setting and revision based on learning from 
comparison of alternative approaches to advancing these goals in different contexts’ (Overdevest & 
Zeitlin, 2012: 4).  
Scholars, past and current, have expressed high hopes of what it is that such 
experimentation in policy-design may achieve. For instance, experimentalist governance is 
advocated as being more effective, more accountable, more democratic, and better suited to 
address complex societal problems than any of the traditional approaches to policy-design (De Búrca 
& Scott, 2006; Sabel & Zeitlin, 2012). However, the literature, past and current, remains rather silent 
as to the actual outcomes of such experimentation (cf., Greenberg & Schroder, 2003; Jordan, 
Wurzel, & Zito, 2013). There is an oft repeated reason for this silence: true experimentation in 
policy-design (with content, process, or both) is often impossible. In an ideal laboratory-like setting 
the experimental policy-design should then be randomly assigned to a test context and not to a 
control context, should affect people or processes in a representative setting, and should be carried 
out long enough to achieve meaningful results (Greenberg & Schroder, 2003). Practical constraints, 
ethical constraints, or both often stand in the way of doing so, which severely affects the 
generalizability of findings from policy-design experimentation (cf., Campbell, 1969). Yet, given the 
wide range of policy-design experiments, either documented or currently undertaken, it should at 
least be possible to now arrive at moderatum generalizations: ‘claims to basic patterns, or 
tendencies, so that other studies are likely to find something similar but not identical’ (Payne & 
Williams, 2005, 306).  
This, then, is the aim of this article: it seeks to add knowledge on contemporary 
experimentation in policy-design (experimentation with content and process), and develop a 
number of moderate insights into such experimentation that might be confirmed or refuted through 
further evidence from other studies. In particular, this paper seeks to understand what design 
characteristics add to achieving successful policy outcomes from experimentation in policy-design. It 
does so through a study of a stratified sample of 31 recent real-world examples of experimentation 
in policy-design in the building sector in Australia, the Netherlands and the United States (US). In 
what follows, in section 2 first the research design is discussed. Then, in section 3, the research 
findings are presented. Finally, section 4 concludes by discussing the main lessons learnt. 
 
2 Policy experimentation in the Australian, Dutch and US building sectors 
The construction, maintenance and use of buildings (together: the ‘building sector’) is widely 
considered key in addressing climate change (Evans, Joas, Sundback, & Thobald, 2005; Yudelson & 
Meyer, 2013). The sector accounts for roughly 35% of global carbon emissions (IPCC, 2007). The 
good news is that the technology and knowledge are available to significantly reduce these 
emissions by 50% over the next 20 years (Newman, Beatley, & Boyer, 2009). Furthermore, it is 
expected that this can be done in a cost-effective manner, making the building sector the only sector 
in the world where high levels of environmental performance (e.g., significant reductions of carbon 
emissions) will not require long-term financial sacrifices (IPCC, 2007). Unfortunately, in recent 
decades it has not proven easy to realize the unique potential the building sector holds. The sector 
faces a number of regulatory barriers that hamper traditional direct intervention by governments, 
and market barriers that hamper voluntary approaches to increasing the sector’s environmental 
performance (for extensive discussions of these barriers, see Abaire, 2008; Bastianoni, Galli, 
Niccolucci, & Pulselli, 2006; Brown, 2001; Van der Heijden, 2013; Zimmerman & Martin, 2001). 
 Seeking to overcome such barriers in the sector, governments, businesses and civil society 
groups around the globe are now collaborating in the development and implementation of policy-
design experiments that seek to realize the potential the building sector holds (for a range of 
examples, see Hickson, 2009). A typical example is the Greener Building Collaboration in Australia 
(fictional name), which brings together the city council of one of Australia’s major cities, a national 
bank, a major fund manager, and property owners in the city’s central business district. In particular, 
it addresses a specific barrier in the industry: property owners can often not find mortgages for 
retrofitting and upgrading their buildings. Banks are risk-averse in supplying mortgages as they 
consider that the cost of the upgrade is not (yet) represented in an increase in a building’s market 
value (cf. Pivo, 2010). Yet, it has been evidenced that the cost of the upgrade will be paid back by 
lower amenity costs, and expected higher rent rates (Eichholtz, Kok, & Quigley, 2010; Pivo, 2010). 
The Collaboration allows the council to enter into agreements with property owners and finance 
providers as a way of funding works to improve the environmental performance of those property 
owners’ buildings. Under the Collaboration the council and a property owner enter into a public 
agreement on the future performance of the property owner’s building(s). The agreement states the 
future environmental performance that is to be achieved by the property owner, and stipulates a 
time frame for achieving this result. The council then lends funds from the bank and provides for the 
property owner to make upgrades to their building(s). The property owner repays these funds 
through a local council charge on the land (i.e., through an increased property tax), which is 
expected to be covered by the reduced energy and maintenance costs of their building(s). Under the 
Collaboration the council gains as it realizes a reduction in the city’s carbon emissions, property 
owners gain as they are provided with low-cost funding to retrofit their buildings and in doing so 
provide much sought-after ‘green’ office space, and finance providers gain as they can provide 
mortgages for a low-risk client (the council). 
 
2.1 Research design 
Based on the known availability of examples of experimentation with policy-designs in the building 
sector (further ‘cases’), such as the Greener Building Collaboration, and the relevance of the sector in 
addressing climate change, the sector was chosen as the sectoral case environment for the study 
reported on in this article. Australia, the Netherlands and the US were selected as the country case 
environments because these countries are particularly active in the type of policy-design 
experimentation addressed in this article (Hoffmann, 2011; Jordan, Wurzel, & Zito, 2005), and 
because of their similarities in case context. That is, the study follows a most-similar systems design, 
but is interested in relevant differences between the individual cases that may help to gain a better 
understanding of experimentation in policy-design (Goertz & Mahon, 2012). 
 A pool of potential cases to study was identified based on an extensive Internet search using 
keywords such as ‘sustainable development AND [country]’, ‘sustainable building AND [country]’, 
‘green building AND [country]’, ‘sustainable construction AND [country]’ and ‘green construction 
AND [country]’. In addition, the author used social media (predominantly, sustainable and ‘green’ 
building groups on LinkedIn) and his network of policymakers, administrators, architects, engineers, 
constructors, developers, investors and the like, in Australia, the Netherlands and the US, to gain 
additional information about potential cases identified in this Internet search. This network was 
further explored for additional potential cases to study.  
 From the pool of potential cases to study (roughly 30 in Australia, 20 in the Netherlands and 
50 in the US), 12 Australian (including the above-discussed Collaboration), 9 Dutch and 11 US cases 
were selected for further analysis when they met a number of criteria (i.e., a stratified sample). First, 
they are an example of experimentation with policy-design in terms of the content of the case – i.e., 
only policy-designs were selected that are different from traditional designs such as direct 
governmental construction regulation or subsidies (cf., Jordan, et al., 2013). Second, they are an 
example of experimentation with policy-design in terms of the process of the case – i.e., only policy-
designs that were the outcome of a collaborative development process including actors from various 
backgrounds (i.e., government, industry representatives, citizen representatives) were selected (cf., 
Gunningham, 2009). Third, they have matured to at least two years of actual implementation – i.e., 
it was expected that some time is needed for the cases to achieve outcomes. Fourth, the policy-
designs selected all move beyond requirements as laid down in building legislation and regulation. 
The latter criterion was chosen to be able to select policy-designs that may be expected to result in 
meaningful action.  
 
2.2 Data collection and analysis 
In order to understand the policy-design content, policy-design process, implementation process and 
outcomes of the cases, a series of in-depth face-to-face interviews was carried out (McCracken, 
1988; Richards, 1996). Interviewees were selected for their expert knowledge on and experience 
with one or more of the cases studied (Longhurst, 2003). This sampling resulted in a pool of 99 
interviewees (53 Australian, 27 Dutch, 19 US) from various backgrounds – i.e. policymakers, 
administrators, investors, developers, architects, engineers and property owners. In addition, in the 
Netherlands a half-day mini-symposium on this topic was organized by the author during the 2012 
International Green Building Week, which attracted 32 participants.1 Then, compared to the 
Australian and Dutch cases studied, the US cases are particularly well documented by both case 
organisations and third parties and well discussed in the social media. This eased the interview load 
for the US cases. Table 1 provides a brief overview of these interviewees.  
 
Table 1 – Interviewees’ background (mini-symposium participants not included) 
 
Interviewee background Government Non-government 
Policy maker 8 (4 Aus/4 Dutch/1 US)   
Administrator 26 (22 Aus/4 Dutch/3 US) 15 (12 Aus/3 Dutch/ 13 US) 
Architect, engineer, advisor  11 (5 Aus/6 Dutch) 
Contractor, developer  7 (3 Aus/4 Dutch)  
Property owner  7 (4 Aus/3 Dutch) 
Other  6 (3 Aus/3 Dutch /2 US) 
Total 38 (26 Aus/8 Dutch/4 US) 61 (27 Aus/19 Dutch/15 US) 
 
 
                                                            
1 The relatively small size of the Netherlands is promising in attracting participants from various backgrounds 
and from all over the country to a mini-symposium. 
Australian interviews were predominantly carried out between September 2011 and February 2012; 
Dutch interviews were carried out between June and September 2012; and US interviews were 
carried out between May and June 2013. Interviews were based on a semi-structured questionnaire 
that provided a structure of checks and balances to assess the validity of the findings (cf. Silverman, 
2001). The questionnaire built on a series of guiding variables that are further discussed in section 
2.3. Interviews were recorded and transcribed into a report that was sent back to the interviewees 
for validation (Fielding & Fielding, 1986). Note that the interviewees were often aware of and 
involved in more than one case. It is expected that this (partly) helps to overcome a sampling bias of 
administrators (and participants) who are overly enthusiastic about their ‘own’ policy-design 
experiment (Sanderson, 2002). Finally, between October 2013 and February 2013 a series of follow-
up interviews was carried out with a number of initial interviewees to discuss the development of 
the policy-design experiments under scrutiny. 
The data were first explored using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) tools, techniques 
and software (Ragin, 1987; Ragin et al., 2006; Schneider & Wagemann, 2010) to gain an insight into 
potential patterns of how cases’ characteristics may affect their outcomes (further 2.3). Contrary to 
most conventional techniques, QCA understands cases as configurations of variables and seeks the 
specific configurations of variables that are likely related to a certain outcome. QCA has quickly 
evolved as an accepted research practice for the type of study presented in this article (Goertz & 
Mahon, 2012; Rihoux, Rezsöhazy, & Bol, 2011). Here fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) is applied to gain an 
understanding of the possible relation between the cases’ characteristics and their outcomes, whilst 
allowing the relative differences between the cases to be brought into the analysis.2 The data were 
further processed by means of a systematic coding scheme (Seale, Gobo, Gubrium, & Silverman, 
2004) and qualitative data analysis software (Atlas.ti). By using this approach the data were 
systematically explored and insights were gained into the ‘repetitiveness’ and ‘rarity’ of the 
experiences shared by the 99 interviewees. Finally, a document study of existing information on 
these 31 cases and existing research on experimental in policy-design was carried out to cross-check 
the validity of the data and findings – i.e. triangulation. 
 
2.3 Guiding variables 
Before setting out to explore the 31 cases, one question related to the aim of this article remains: 
what exactly is it that an experiment in policy-design should achieve to assess it as a success? In 
other words, what outcomes may be expected from such experimentation? This seemingly easy 
question turns out to be difficult to answer, and the extant literature is not yet settled on this 
question. Some scholars argue that an experiment in policy-design is successful if it generates 
relevant lessons about how it operates in practice (May, 1992; Petts, 2007; R. Rose, 2001); for 
instance, about how building contractors understand and are willing to comply with the policy-
design. Others argue that a policy-design can only be considered successful when it meets its 
intended outcomes (cf., Dunn, 2003; Marsh & McConnell, 2010), for instance, a certain number of 
buildings constructed. For yet others a policy-design is successful if it achieves ‘soft outcomes’, for 
                                                            
2 The author applies QCA methodology, logic and tools mainly to gain an insight into potential relevant 
patterns in the data collected that are difficult, if not impossible, to trace otherwise. These patterns are then 
used as a starting point for a more descriptive analysis of the data collected. The author is critical of too strong 
a reliance on QCA tools as it, eventually, forces researchers to break down their rich qualitative data into 
quantifiable units, which may work well for some qualitative studies or criteria, but surely not for all 
(ANONYMOUS). 
instance, spillover effects from participants to non-participants in the policy-design experiment, the 
setting of a focal point, or the normalization of certain (intended) behaviour (cf., Darnall & Sides, 
2008; Lyon & Maxwell, 2007). 
This article builds on established work in the field of environmental policy by Potoski and 
Prakash (2009) in evaluating policy-design experiments, and considers (HO.i) the number of 
participants in a case, and (HO.ii) the number of buildings constructed or retrofitted within a case as 
a proxy for its success. Both outcome variables are observable and countable, and can be related to 
the experiments’ stated ambitions – making these variables suitable for the aim of the research (cf., 
Stone, 2002). For example, the above-mentioned Collaboration targets over a thousand buildings, 
but has thus far only resulted in 27 agreements between the city council and property owners for a 
total of 45 buildings to be retrofitted, and only a handful of buildings that had been or were being 
retrofitted at the time of this study. It has, however, attracted hundreds of participants since it was 
launched in 2009 (three years before the research was carried out). Consequently, the programme is 
evaluated as not having achieved meaningful results in terms of buildings built or retrofitted (HO.ii), 
but as having achieved meaningful results in terms of participants (HO.i). 
 Building on the extant policy-design and experimentalist governance literature a series of 
variables are distilled that are assumed to be related to these outcomes. They relate to the content 
and process of the policy-design experiment. Content characteristics that may positively add to 
achieving outcomes are: (C.i) a direct financial gain for those participating in the experiment (Heyes 
& Maxwell, 2004); (C.ii) a strong focus on the private gain for participating, for instance in terms of 
building close networks with policy makers, limiting access to the market for competitors, or tapping 
into a potential future client base (e.g., Croci, 2005) – please note, direct financial gain is often found 
to be the leading ‘private interest’ for participation, which is why it is considered separately in this 
article (cf., Van der Heijden, 2012); (C.iii) a strong focus of the policy-design on and explicit reference 
to the greater public interest (here, addressing climate change) participants serve (e.g., Rivera & de 
Leon, 2004); and (C.iv) the opportunity to show leadership and being recognized as a leader (e.g., 
Khanna & Anton, 2002). Process characteristics that may positively add to achieving outcomes are: 
(P.i) an engaged community of participants in terms of participants sharing their knowledge and 
insights during the design-process (e.g., Solomon, 2008); (P.ii) collaboration and deliberation, and a 
sharing of decision making powers during the design-process (e.g.,  Lobel, 2004); (P.iii) financial 
support for the experimentation process from government (e.g., Héritier & Eckert, 2008); and (P.iv) 
the opportunity to be able to steer the trajectory of future policy through direct interaction with 
government (e.g., Termeer, 2009). As with the outcome variables, these explanatory variables are, 
to a certain extent, measurable (albeit based on the qualitative interview data) and are therefore 
suitable for the aim of this research (cf., Stone, 2002). 
 
3 Research findings 
Table 2 provides a summary of the data by unpacking each case into the key variables discussed 
(section 2.3). A four-point scale is used to indicate whether a case meets a variable or not, and to 
give some insight into the relative variance between the cases studied. A ‘++’ indicates a substantial 
positive score (e.g., there is a very clear focus on and explicit mentioning of the public interest in the 
policy-design documentation – C.ii; or, there is a very large number of buildings constructed or 
retrofitted within a case as compared to the case's ambitions – HO.ii); a ‘+’ indicates a moderate 
positive score (e.g., there is some financial gain relative to other cases studied – C.i); a ‘-‘ indicates a 
moderate negative score (e.g., collaboration was flawed because not all relevant parties were 
involved – P.ii; or, the case has only attracted a very small number of intended participants as 
compared to its ambitions – HO.i); finally, a ‘--‘ indicates a substantial negative score on or full 
absence of the criterion in the case (e.g., there is no opportunity to show leadership or be 
recognized as a leader – C.iii).3 
 
Table 2 – Summary of data 
 
Cases* Characteristics of the experimental policy-designs studied** 
 Content Process Outcomes 
 C.i C.ii C.iii C.iv P.i P.ii P.iii P.iv HO.i HO.ii 
1 (Aus) ++ ++ - ++ ++ + + - ++ ++ 
2 (Aus) ++ ++ - ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ + 
3 (Aus) + - ++ -- ++ + - -- ++ + 
4 (Aus) + - -- - -- -- -- ++ + - 
6 (Aus) + + - + + + ++ - + -- 
9 (Aus) + -- + + + ++ - ++ ++ - 
11 (Aus) + - ++ + - -- -- -- + - 
12 (Aus) ++ -- + ++ - - ++ -- + - 
13 (Aus) ++ -- + ++ - - ++ -- + - 
15 (Aus) + -- ++ -- ++ ++ + + ++ - 
17 (Aus) ++ + + ++ ++ + ++ -- + - 
18 (Aus) - + - - ++ + - ++ + + 
19 (NL) ++ + -- -- -- -- -- -- + + 
20 (NL) -- + + ++ + + ++ ++ + - 
21 (NL) ++ ++ -- - ++ + - + -- -- 
22 (NL) + + - + - + + ++ + - 
23 (NL) ++ -- + + - + + - + + 
24 (NL) ++ -- + ++ - - ++ -- + - 
25 (NL) + + + + + + + ++ + + 
26 (NL) + + - ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ - 
27 (NL) ++ ++ - ++ ++ ++ + - ++ + 
42 (USA) ++ + - -- + - ++ - + + 
44 (USA) + + - + + + ++ - - -- 
45 (USA) + + - + ++ - ++ - + + 
47 (USA) + - ++ + ++ + ++ - ++ - 
48 (USA) ++ ++ - + + - + -- + + 
49 (USA) + + + ++ ++ + ++ ++ + - 
50 (USA) + ++ ++ - + - + -- + + 
52 (USA) ++ ++ + ++ - -- ++ - - - 
53 (USA) ++ ++ -- ++ ++ ++ - - ++ + 
55 (USA) ++ ++ - ++ ++ + + - ++ ++ 
 
* Please note that this article reports on a study that sits in a larger study, which addresses more than the 31 
cases discussed here. This explains why the case numbers surpass the number 31. 
** Abbreviations as per section 2.3. 
 
In the following sections the data are first explored using fsQCA techniques and logic (Ragin, 
2000; Ragin, et al., 2006) to trace patterns in the data. Through a descriptive analysis the data and 
these patterns are then further explored (Seale, et al., 2004; Silverman, 2001).  
                                                            
3 For the fsQCA analysis these scores were translated as: ‘++’ equals ‘1’; ‘+’ equals ‘0.66’; ‘-‘ equals ‘0.33’; and  
‘--‘ equals ‘0’ (cf. Ragin et al. 2006). 
3.1 QCA analysis 
The various policy experiments analysed show better outcomes in terms of the participants they 
have attracted (HO.i) than in terms of the number of buildings built or retrofitted they have realized 
(HO.ii). This confirms earlier literature on the subject (Potoski & Prakash, 2009). At question now is 
what clusters of characteristics are likely related to these outcomes; and whether the cluster(s) of 
characteristics related to outcome HO.i is(are) similar to or different from the cluster(s) of 
characteristics related to outcome HO.ii. That is, these clusters may help to gain insight into how 
cases that do achieve moderate to substantial numbers of participants may be adjusted to be more 
likely to achieve moderate to substantial numbers of buildings built or retrofitted. 
In looking at the data collected through the lens of fsQCA, only two patterns of characteristics 
stand out that are likely related to the achievement of a moderate to substantial number of 
participants. These are: 
(I) a financial gain for those participating in the experiment, combined with a strong focus 
on the private gain for participating (C.i + C.ii) 
(II) a financial gain for those participating in the experiment, combined with a strong focus 
on the greater public interest (here, addressing climate change) participants serve, the 
opportunity to show leadership and being recognized as a leader, and financial support 
for the experimentation process (C.i + C.iii + C.iv + P.iii) 
 
Then, in looking at data collected through the lens of fsQCA only one pattern of 
characteristics stands out that is likely related to the achievement of a moderate to substantial 
number of buildings built or retrofitted: 
  
(I) a financial gain for those participating in the experiment, combined with a strong focus 
on the private gain for participating (C.i + C.ii) 
 
This seems to imply that within the set of cases studied participants are attracted to 
participate in policy-design experiments where the financial risks are low: those that resemble free-
market situations (I), and those that promise visibility in terms of showcasing leadership with little 
cost involved for participants (II.) Yet, only cases with a clear focus on participants’ financial interest 
are most likely to result in successful outcomes in terms of substantial numbers of buildings built or 
retrofitted with high levels of environmental performance (I). 
Although an interesting finding, this may be considered bad news for policy-design 
experimentation as such. After all, this finding seems to imply that predominantly a small part of the 
content of the policy-design experiments (C.i and C.ii) matters to achieve moderate to substantial 
outcomes (at least HO.i and HO.ii), whereas the process of the policy-design experiments hardly 
plays a role. At first glance, this seems to go against a large part of the discussed (normative) 
literature that considers exactly this process to be relevant for experimentation with policy-designs. 
Further, given that the clusters of characteristics related to outcome HO.i overlap with the cluster of 
characteristics related to outcome HO.ii, the QCA analysis tells us little about how to improve the 
policy-designs of these experiments so as to result in more buildings built or retrofitted with high 
levels of environmental performance. 
But the QCA analysis is only a part of the story. Why exactly have so many cases not 
achieved substantial outcomes in terms of buildings built or retrofitted? And what exactly is the role 
of the process of the policy-design experiments studied? To answer these questions a descriptive 
analysis of the 99 interviews is provided in what follows. 
 
3.2 Attracting participants 
In terms of attracting participants, the cases show relative success – related to their stated 
ambitions. A third of the cases studied have attracted a substantial number of participants (32%, 
n=10), and more than half of the cases studied have attracted a moderate number of participants 
(58%, n=18). Interviewee accounts support the outcomes of the QCA analysis, and give some better 
understanding of why (prospective) participants are especially attracted to policy-design 
experiments that promise high financial gains, or at least low financial risks, and those that serve 
their private interest. Further, these interview accounts also provide insights into the difficulty of 
attracting participants in the 31 cases studied, and possible ways of attracting higher numbers of 
participants to this type of experiment in policy-design.  
 
Financial gain 
In the large majority of the cases (94%, n=29) participation will result in financial gain for the non-
state parties involved, with many of the cases analysed having a strong focus on overcoming 
financial barriers for developers, constructors, owners and users of buildings in reducing carbon 
emissions. Interviewees often stressed that this financial gain was key to getting participants on 
board. As a representative of a Dutch builders’ umbrella organization explained: ‘What our members 
wish to know is whether or not it is financially viable to go sustainable, and within what boundaries 
successful outcomes of experiments are likely to be expected’ (int69).4 Notably, this focus on 
financial gain achieved some serious criticism from interviewees. ‘They [the participants of these 
cases] are not thinking about the environment, they can make money out of [participating]!’ one of 
the interviewees colourfully expressed (int46). These interviewees were concerned that without the 
(promise) of a financial gain (prospective) participants would not be interested in developing, buying 
or occupying buildings with higher levels of sustainability. They further questioned whether a 
financial incentive truly is a suitable approach to achieve long-term change in the sector.  
That having been said, often the financial gain of participating is minimal compared to the 
huge costs of developing and maintaining buildings, so some interviewees explained: ‘the amount of 
the grant [case#12] is relatively small if you take into account that a development could range 
somewhere around 80 to 85 million dollars. Is one or one and a half million [the grant provided] an 
influence as to whether you go ahead with the deal, or not? However, the grant did serve to 
stimulate a focus on sustainability measures and a learning environment in which the developers 
and planners were thinking how to go further, how to push boundaries’ (int27). This may indicate 
that the financial gain not only has monetary but also symbolic value for the participants (cf., 
Cialdini, 2009). 
 
                                                            
4 In line with the custom of qualitative social science research interviewees provided me with their insights in 
confidence. As such the identities of the interviewees (nor the cases studied) cannot be provided. To give the 
reader insight in the variance of the interviews voice is given to them by referring to individual interviewees 
with a number (e.g. ‘int50’). Please note that some interviewees are referred to with numbers higher than 99 
(the number of interviews used for this article). Please note that this research essay reports on a study that sits 
in a larger study, which addresses over 50 cases based on over 200 interviews – brief descriptions of all the 
cases in this larger study can be obtained from www.REMOVED FOR REVIEW.info. 
Private interest 
About two-thirds of the cases studied (67%, n=21) have a clear focus on the private interests of 
participants when participating in the process of policy-design experimentation. As one of the 
interviewees explained: ‘If you talk to anyone you find that they know right from wrong. You find 
that they want to do the right thing. With any reasonable opportunity they run for it [sustainable 
development]. They are happy to do so. They feel better about themselves. But it does not stretch 
into self-sacrifice very much at all. Self-preservation kicks in over ambition fairly early’ (int29). 
Mostly the self-interest this interviewee is referring to comes in the form of financial gains when 
participation gives participants a competitive advantage over non-participants, such as in case#1, 
case#2, case#27 and case#55 (all examples of benchmarking tools). In other cases participation 
brings non-state actors closer to state actors, which may give them some influence in broader 
policymaking processes. For instance, an interviewee in case#18 (a particular type of covenant) 
explained: ‘[Participation in an experiment] is a bit for the profile of the [participating] organizations. 
It can also be a point to coordinate activities with governments. Often the steering committee [of an 
experiment] is formed with various government agencies. It provides a bit of a funnel for interaction’ 
(int51). Also, obtaining information, mostly about how to save costs, was considered a strong 
motivator for participation. Case#3, case#20, case#45 and case#47, for example, are fully designed 
about sharing such information among state actors and non-state actors in general, and among 
participating non-state actors in particular. This all confirms existing literature in this field (cf., Van 
der Heijden, 2012). 
 
What hampers the attracting of participants? 
Not only do interview accounts give an insight into why the majority of experiments have been 
successful in attracting participants, they also give some insights into why others have not been. 
Interestingly, interviewees were critical of, in particular, the design process of a range of 
experiments studied.  
 First, in about a third of the cases (35%, n=11) interviewees were critical of the process of 
collaboration and deliberation between state and non-state stakeholders in developing the policy-
design experiment. Such collaborations are considered relevant in the current policy and governance 
literature for successful outcomes (e.g. Lobel, 2004; Solomon, 2008). It is expected to result in an 
understanding about what it is the governed (non-state) actors are willing to change from the 
current status quo, and what they are (reasonably) able to change. Through a shared process of 
developing a policy-design it may then be expected that more (prospective) participants are willing 
to join the experiment as it builds from their experiences (i.e., bottom up) and they feel ownership 
of the experiment. Interviewees were, however, critical of the practical limitations of collaboration, 
especially in situations where many actors are involved. It is not difficult to understand that the 
larger a group of (prospective) participants, the more difficult it is to reach consensus among them. 
As an administrator of case#17 (which aims for a wide uptake of solar panels in the Dutch rental 
sector) made clear: ‘It is difficult to develop something on a large scale and get everyone on board. 
There are so many different organizational foci, so many decision-making processes, so many people 
involved’ (int93). In this particular case the majority of the initial participants in the collaborative 
development process decided not to participate in the implementation of the experiment as they 
did not recognize their input in the final policy-design experiment. 
 Second, interviewees noted a potential ‘participation fatigue’ and ‘participation confusion’ in 
the sector as a result of the wide variety of possible experiments to join and the ongoing 
introduction of new experiments at local, regional, national and international level. The set of cases 
studied in this article is but a selected subset of a much larger set of policy-design experiments in the 
building sector. Although interviewees did not consider competition between the various 
experiments, they noted the absence of collaboration between or coherence among these.5 ‘The 
sustainable movement is very fragmented. Everyone moves in the same direction, but hardly anyone 
is working together. Some do, but most are in their own little tower,’ a senior representative of a 
private firm in the US noted (int183). Here interviewees considered that more collaboration among 
the various experiments can take away some of the confusion and fatigue in the sector. An 
illustrative example here is case#3, an experimental tenant community started in one of Australia’s 
major cities. When implementing the policy-design its administrators had no intention of scaling the 
experiment beyond the city limits. However, other Australian cities were interested in the 
experiment as well. Instead of developing their own experiments they followed the ‘brand’ as 
introduced by this initial city and introduced local adjustments to it. The policy-design is now 
implemented in most of Australia’s major cities and as a national framework has attracted over 425 
tenancies throughout Australia. In particular, the clear ‘brand’ of the experiment was considered key 
in attracting participants by the administrators of this experiment in various Australian cities.  
 
How to attract more participants? 
When asked directly how to attract more participants interviewees generally referred to the process 
of the policy-design experiments as being of importance. Following on from the critique of the 
collaborative processes, they believed that more interaction with potential participants may result in 
experiments that are indeed sought after by potential participants. In addition, the process of 
developing policy-designs may in certain cases have been rushed, leaving insufficient time to come 
to designs that were acceptable for a (potentially) large number of participants, so explained 
interviewees. For instance, it is telling that in only a few cases (23%, n=7) were various alternatives 
considered before choosing the final policy-design. In all other cases no alternatives were 
considered. Furthermore, in over half of the cases studied (61%, n=19) interviewees even referred to 
a process that resembles prototyping more than actual experimentation (cf., Sanderson, 2002). In 
these cases the experiments have been designed with the aim implementing them irrespective of 
the outcomes of the process of experimenting. Interviewees criticized this lack of collaboration and 
true experimentation during these policy-design processes. 
Further, interviewees noted that the various policy-design experiments often attract the 
same participants. They referred to a small group of truly concerned developers, contractors, 
architects, engineers, property owners and tenants who are often willing to participate in these type 
of experiments, whilst the majority of the sector is not. A quote from an administrator of case #53 
(which particularly aims to convert that majority) is typical of the tenor among interviewees: ‘You 
cannot push businesses into it. We learnt that however much work we put into outreach you still 
only reach those who already slightly get it. You don’t get the ones who don’t have some basic 
understanding or are already a bit concerned about sustainability. That is the hard lesson we have 
learnt’ (int194). Some interviewees thought that it may be more fruitful to work through the 
networks of participants to reach out to a larger community of potential participants than stick to 
more classical approaches such as keeping a website and attending trade fairs. They thought that 
                                                            
5 Even more, in many of the cases studied interviewees were not aware of the other cases included in this 
study – even those that were implemented in, for instance, the same city. 
targeting non-participants through the network of participants may create a ‘ripple effect’ 
throughout the sector. 
 
3.3 Achieving buildings with high levels of environmental performance 
Only a very small number of cases (7%, n=2) has achieved a substantial number of buildings built or 
retrofitted, and just a bit over a third of the cases has achieved a moderate number of buildings 
(39%, n=12) – related to the ambitions of the cases. Interviewee accounts largely confirm the 
outcomes of the QCA analysis, but also shed some more light on why so few cases have, thus far, 
achieved a substantial number of buildings built or retrofitted.  
 
Financial gain and private interest 
The most successful policy-design experiments in terms of buildings built or retrofitted are building 
benchmarking tools (case#1, case#2, case#27 and case#55). The aim of this type of policy-design is 
to rank buildings against each other, and communicate a building’s relative performance through a 
label. This further allows building developers or property owners to market their buildings as 
performing better than those of their competitors who not participate in benchmarking. Such 
benchmarking or labelling has been found to be successful in other sectors as well (Cashore, Auld, & 
Newsom, 2004; Cooper & Symes, 2009), and in the buildings sector there is some evidence that 
buildings in such benchmarking arrangements yield better returns than those that are not (Eichholtz, 
et al., 2010). In short, benchmarking very clearly serves the self-interest of participants – and 
especially building developers and property owners. 
The other types of experimental policy-designs (e.g., novel forms of financing, competitive 
grants, tenant communities) proved to be less successful in achieving substantial numbers of 
buildings built or retrofitted. Here interviewees in all countries pointed to a significant barrier to 
improving environmental performance in the building sector: a perception of higher upfront costs 
for buildings with high levels of environmental performance combined with a (perceived) weak 
economy, often addressed as the global financial crisis (GFC). In these cases it is less clear for 
participants that building or retrofitting buildings will indeed result in financial gain – this is exactly 
one of the things the experiments seek to evidence, so interviewees explained.  Nevertheless, 
interviewees expressed high hopes of what their experiments may achieve in the future. Generally, 
interviewees did not consider a change in economic circumstances necessary to increase the number 
of buildings built, but an increase of business cases evidences that these types of buildings ultimately 
are cheaper to operate and maintain than conventional buildings. As the programme manager of a 
US experimental policy-design of tripartite financing mentioned (case#42, along the lines of the 
above-mentioned Collaboration): ‘There probably is a group dynamic. When more projects are 
getting [built], when there are more success stories, when there is demonstration to the owner in 
terms of increasing their cash flow, or improving building value, then it will start to become more of 
a robust market’ (int179).  
 
What hampers the achievement of buildings built or retrofitted? 
As with participation, interviewees were critical of the process of the policy-design experiments. 
They considered that without true collaboration, programme administrators are unable to 
understand what it is that (potential) participants are willing and able to do to build or retrofit 
buildings with high levels of environmental performance. This indicates that the process of policy-
design is more relevant than the QCA analysis initially indicated – which is unsurprising because the 
QCA analysis presented looks at the potential causes of success only, and does not consider 
potential causes of non-success. 
 In addition, interviewees in a small number of cases (16%, n=5) referred to a mismatch 
between the policy-design experiment and its legal or regulatory context. In short, although these 
cases have attracted a moderate to substantial number of interested participants, they cannot yet 
build or retrofit their buildings as current legislation does not allow the solution the experimental 
policy-design provides. A typical example is case#6, the above-mentioned Greener Building 
Collaboration. Although the experiment was started in 2009 and had attracted a moderate number 
of participants by 2011, it was not before 2012 that a change in the city act finally allowed the city to 
borrow money and give this to commercial property owners for retrofits. For interviewees in other 
Australian cities this was exactly the reason to treat the case with some care before starting related 
experiments: ‘We are legislatively bound and [copying case#6] would require legislative changes that 
could take up to eighteen months. Two questions need to be answered first: is [case#6] successful in 
[city X], and if so, is the effort to implement the programme [here] worth the outcome?’ (int27). 
 
How to achieve more buildings with high levels of environmental performance? 
When asked directly how the outcomes of these policy-design experiments may be improved, 
interviewees predominantly pointed towards what they considered the shortcoming of the 
experiments analysed: participation in all these is voluntary. There is, of course, a clear logic to this. 
It will normally be politically untenable to mandate participation in an experiment when the 
(possible) outcomes of the experiment are unclear or uncertain. Yet, as interviewees argued, many 
experiments have been in force for more than five, and sometimes ten years (e.g., case#55); and 
many (77%, n=24) have resulted in knowledge that evidences the possibilities of constructing or 
retrofitting high-performing buildings in a cost-effective way. Making a move from voluntary 
experiments to mandatory action was considered the most effective way to scale up and speed up 
the implementation of lessons learnt in these experiments. One interviewee highlighted: ‘The speed 
in which we react is out of sync with the problems we face. Although a lot of [experiments] make 
sense, they are not fast enough in addressing problems. Regulation is needed’ (int33).  
Subsequently, interviewees in various cases referred to the importance of peer pressure for 
ensuring that participants act in line with the goal of the policy experiments. Administrators of 
policy-design experiments, especially from Australia and the US, referred to the positive effects of 
rewarding leaders within the experiment. As they further explained, rewarding mechanisms can be 
relatively low cost and are easily built in to a design – for instance, by showcasing leading buildings 
on their websites, by running yearly award ceremonies, or by seeking media coverage for leaders in 
the experiment. Such activities, as interviewees explained, add to the creation of strong 
communities where acting in line with the ambitions of the policy-design is the norm.  
 
4 Discussion and conclusion 
Building on the existing experimentation in policy-design literature, this article has assessed 31 
examples of contemporary policy-design experiments in the building sectors of Australia, the 
Netherlands and the US. These examples are all characterized by experimentation with the content 
and process of policy-design. Through a QCA analysis the article first sought to understand what 
clusters of characteristics of these policy-design experiments are likely related to successful 
outcomes in terms of attracting participants, and in terms of buildings built or retrofitted with high 
levels of environmental performance. Then, through a descriptive analysis of 99 interviews with key 
actors in these experiments and secondary data, the article sought to understand why so many of 
these 31 policy-design experiments fail to achieve substantial numbers of buildings built or 
retrofitted with high levels of environmental performance, even though they attracted moderate or 
substantial numbers of participants.  
 The QCA analysis confirms much of the existing (qualitative and quantitative) research in this 
area. Experimentation in environmental policy is likely to be successful if participation comes at low 
financial risk, and preferably with financial gain (cf., Baron & Diermeier, 2007; Croci, 2005). Yet, 
interview accounts highlight that even a small monetary gain may be enough to attract participants. 
Future research may wish to address the relevance of such symbolic monetary gains in policy-design 
experimentation, and how symbolic gains can best be framed to attract participants. Future research 
may further wish to address whether objective gains (i.e., evidence based), anticipated or expected 
gains (i.e., as promised by the policy-design developers), or symbolic gains matter most in attracting 
participants. Then, the QCA analysis also points to the ability of participants to show leadership and 
be recognized as a leader as a key criterion for attracting participants to an experiment. Yet, 
interview accounts are less clear on this aspect of the experiments studied. It may be that those 
participating in these types of experiments, and especially the administrators of these experiments, 
are so used to working with leaders in the sector that they consider leadership the norm and not the 
exception in policy practice (cf., J. Rose, 2011). This issue may be further explored in future research.  
 The QCA analysis further indicated that in achieving policy outcomes (here defined as 
attracting participants and achieving buildings with high levels of environmental performance) the 
content of the policy-design experiments mattered more in the 31 cases studied than the process of 
experimentation. This is of interest as it partly contradicts the current understanding in the literature 
of the role of collaboration and participation in the development of policy-designs (e.g., Lobel, 2004; 
Solomon, 2008). That having been said, the descriptive analysis of the interviews helps to better 
explain the findings from the QCA analysis: interviewees were rather critical of the characteristics of 
the process of the experiments. Collaboration was often found to be weak; only in a few cases were 
content alternatives considered before entering into a testing of the policy-design; and in a number 
of cases studied the process of experimenting came closer to prototyping than an actual open 
experimentation process. In light of these critiques, then, it is not surprising that the experiments 
perform poorly. Future research may continue the line of research started in this article by carefully 
studying policy-design experiments with less flawed processes, aiming to understand the exact role 
and impact of the policy-design process on the experiments’ outcomes. 
 The descriptive analysis further taught two major lessons related to the ongoing 
proliferation of policy-design experiments. On the one hand, this proliferation may result in 
‘participation fatigue’ or ‘participation confusion’ when (prospective) participants are either asked 
too often to participate in experiments, or when they simply cannot decide on what experiment to 
join as these all promise different outcomes and require different input. This is a relevant lesson for 
those wishing to start a new experiment in policy-design. Instead of adding a fully novel experiment 
to the pool of existing experiments it may be wiser to join an existing one (local, regional, national, 
or international). The current literature on experimentation in policy-designs indicates that all over 
the world a very wide range of policy-designs is being experimented with, making it likely that an 
existing experiment can be joined. By teaming up with an existing experiment resources can be 
shared in terms of marketing the experiment and attracting participants.  
On the other hand, the proliferation of experiments may result in competition for 
participants between the experiments. Although interviewees did not directly refer to such 
competition, some interviewees were aware of how their experiment performs compared to 
(certain) others and acted to this. ‘We keep the [performance] data to ourselves for now. We are 
being compared with other [experiments]. [Experiments] that run much longer. We will show our 
data when there are clear success stories to show,’ one of the interviewees stated (int187). There is, 
of course, a clear logic for such behaviour. Successful experiments are more likely to attract more 
participants and government funds. However, such (perverse) behaviour seems to go exactly against 
the goal of experimentation: drawing lessons on whether and how novel policy-designs achieve their 
intended goals. This is the value of experimentation. It is not about evidencing that a policy-design is 
able to achieve (some) success stories. Future research may wish to critically assess the reported 
outcomes of policy-design experiments, aiming to understand how often and under what 
circumstances administrators refrain from presenting the full story of the experimentation.  
 Finally, and most strikingly, the majority of the experiments studied (87%, n=27) aimed to 
evidence something obvious: that buildings with high levels of environmental performance are not 
more costly, and are sometimes cheaper to build, operate, maintain and use than traditional 
buildings with low levels of environmental performance. Yet, these opportunities and possibilities 
have been known for some decades now and are very well documented (e.g, Beddoes & Booth, 
2012; Register, 1987). Why then repeat the same experiment, albeit in different forms, over and 
over and over again? This may point to the feeling that, at least in the building sector, there is 
something inherently wrong with policy-design experimentation: the experiments are not truly novel 
policy-designs, but different approaches to treating the same symptom. The symptom here is that 
existing technology and knowledge are not used by actors in the building sector. The core of the 
problem, according to many of the interviewees, is, however, not unwillingness to use this 
technology and knowledge, but unfamiliarity with this technology and knowledge, and unfamiliarity 
with what it may achieve in terms of reduced carbon emissions and financial savings. Thus, instead 
of keeping a narrow symptom focus, those involved in policy-design experimentation may wish to 
focus on the core of the problem and develop policy-designs that address this. Cases #3 and #47, for 
instance, are illustrative examples where participants are educated about possibilities, and learn 
from each other’s solutions to improving the environmental performance of their buildings. Sharing 
lessons and re-educating actors in the building sector based on already widely available knowledge 
may be a more fruitful approach to achieving a necessary scaling up of sustainable performance in 
this sector (cf., Biermann, 2008) than reinventing the wheel over and over again. 
To conclude, this research has shed some new light on contemporary policy-design 
experimentation in the building sector, and has raised serious concerns about such experimentation. 
These lessons may be taken to other sectors as well, and may be further explored in future research. 
After all, the characteristics of the building sector give promise to positive outcomes of experimental 
policy-designs that seek to improve the environmental performance of the sector. With other 
sectors sharing far fewer of these positive characteristics (cf., IPCC, 2007) it may be a question of 
whether the rather poor performance of the cases studied in the building sector echoes in other 
sectors as well, or is even magnified due to less positive characteristics – or, unexpectedly, is not. 
That having been said, asking whether experimentation in policy-design generally works or not is 
likely to be the wrong question. The study presented highlights that experimentation in policy-
design sometimes works, and sometimes does not. Rather, it is more important to learn about the 
specific conditions under which experimentation achieves its outcomes and how. By carefully 
unpacking 31 real-world examples of policy-design experimentation this article has taken a small 
step toward trying to better understand these conditions. 
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